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IMPRESSIONS OF LIFE AND LAW ON 
THE HIGH COURT BENCH  
Matthew Palmer* 
The following is a public lecture given at Victoria University of Wellington on 27 March 2018, 
organised by the New Zealand Centre for Public Law. In it Justice Matthew Palmer compares his 
impressions of life and law on the High Court Bench with that in practice and in academia. 
I INTRODUCTION 
E ngā mana, e ngā waka, e ngā reo. Tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou katoa. 
Do not tell the Chief Justice but, since my appointment, I have been keeping a diary about my 
impressions of life and law on the High Court bench – or "judgery" to use a phrase she has used.1 I 
drew on this in giving a lecture entitled "The Judiciary and the Legal Academy" in Hong Kong in 
December 2016. My starting point was a quote from Richard Posner in his 2016 book on the judiciary 
and academy, Divergent Paths.2 Justice Glazebrook has since considered that book in more depth in 
relation to the New Zealand Supreme Court.3 The quote was:4 
Judges have had roughly two thousand years of experience in trying, with considerable success, to awe 
the laity, project a self-congratulatory aura, conceal their failures and inadequacies. As an insider I know 
how to pull back the curtain, and I think it will actually help the institution for me to do so. 
Posner wrote this book after 36 years as a judge of the United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 
which followed a full-time career as a law professor at the University of Chicago. My experience is 
much less fulsome. But I have found comparing my experience of the judiciary and the academy to 
  
*  Judge of the High Court of New Zealand. Nothing in this address should be taken to represent the views of 
the New Zealand judiciary (or academy). 
1  Sian Elias, Chief Justice of New Zealand "Judgery and the Rule of Law" (speech at Otago University Faculty 
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2  Richard A Posner Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Mass), 2016). 
3  Susan Glazebrook "Academics and the Supreme Court" (2017) 48 VUWLR 237. 
4  Posner, above n 2, at x. 
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be thought-provoking. Today, I share some of my thoughts with a New Zealand audience, and throw 
in a few comparisons with the legal profession for good measure. I do so with some apprehension, as 
my audience today appears primarily to be drawn from the judiciary, academy and profession. I 
welcome your academic critiques, professional submissions and appellate over-rulings, as I must. 
II AUCKLAND AND WELLINGTON 
Before I start properly, though, I should note one factor which complicates my observations which 
are, after all, based on my personal experience of the institutions I examine. My career has jumped 
around a fair bit: from the public service to academia, to the legal profession in government, then to 
the bar, and then to the bench. When I jumped from the bar to the bench, I also jumped from 
Wellington to Auckland. The then-Attorney-General told me I had a choice about that, though I am 
not sure he and the Chief Justice shared the same view about whose call that was. Despite my 12-
year-old daughter telling me I had ruined her life forever, I thought being exposed to Auckland would 
be good for my continuing legal education. I said in my swearing-in I was "not sure that it is now 
possible to understand New Zealand, and therefore New Zealand law, without understanding 
Auckland". Now, I am sure: it is not possible. In this respect, at least, Auckland has exceeded my 
expectations, as it has my daughter's, who now appears happy to have become an Auckland teenager, 
though not just another Aucklander. 
Compared to Wellington, there is less engagement between the bench and profession and the legal 
academy in Auckland. At neither Auckland law school do you find the numbers or diversity of 
attendees at a public lecture you do here even in the better weather there. I applaud and encourage the 
Victoria University of Wellington Law Faculty in continuing to maintain its level and quality of 
external engagement. We find, at this meeting place, perspectives on and ideas about the law in society 
that can only benefit from being exposed to other perspectives and ideas. In general, I have found 
there is less interest in abstract ideas, let alone politics or policy, in Auckland than in Wellington – 
whether on the sidelines of kids' cricket or netball, at dinner parties or even in the academic lecture 
theatre or the courtroom. There is, however, more interest in business and property (and traffic). 
The relative lack of interest in policy amongst counsel in the Auckland courtroom may be related 
to what I perceive to be the longer tail in the Auckland legal profession than in Wellington. In my 
view, the Auckland legal profession is more diverse in terms of proficiency as well as ethnicity (and 
those two variables are not related). It suffers from less coherence, and benefits from that as well. In 
my experience Auckland counsel rarely talk to each other before a hearing even about how to divide 
their time, let alone the legal issues at stake. They will likely practise in entirely different villages, 
called suburbs. They may well not know each other and are, in my view, relatively more prone to 
argue every point, including points that do not matter (though no lawyer is immune from that 
temptation). So I think the relative lack of assumed social norms makes litigation less efficient in 
Auckland than in Wellington. The same aspects also make it less cosy and intimate, which can be a 
good thing if norms in the legal profession are not healthy. 
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My impression is that the nature of the court's case-load is different in Auckland and Wellington. 
Of my 188 judgments so far, 15 per cent have centred on public law issues. That is higher than I was 
expecting. I suspect the proportion is higher in Wellington although, interestingly, the statistics 
suggest there is a similar proportion of judicial reviews. Certainly there is a higher proportion of 
criminal cases in Auckland. In the year to June 2017, 18 per cent of the new business in the Auckland 
High Court Registry was made up of criminal trials and appeals compared to 10 per cent in 
Wellington. I also suspect there are relatively more commercial cases in Auckland. Speaking for 
myself, 40 per cent of my cases have been criminal, 60 per cent are civil. Twenty-four per cent have 
centred on commercial, property, trust or common law issues.  
I had not realised, before living in Auckland, just how different these two cities are, in their 
populations, their publics, their cultures. And, of course, this shows up in the business before the 
courts. Of the four juries I have empanelled in Auckland, only one has had a Pākehā majority. The 
juries in Hamilton and Rotorua have looked quite different. Of the 188 judgments I have issued so 
far, 44 per cent of the 263 litigants whose ethnicity I could determine with reasonable confidence have 
been Pākehā; 14 per cent have been Māori; 10 per cent have been Pasifika; 13 per cent have been 
Chinese; and 14 per cent have been other Southeast Asian and Indian. I do not have equivalent 
numbers for Wellington but I suspect they would be different. 
And these differences show up in terms of cultural attitudes to law too. I have been struck by how 
often first-generation Chinese litigants are in court with each other over matters which most Pākehā 
or Māori usually settle without reaching the courts. Lawyers may contribute to that or perhaps there 
are cultural factors at play. I do not know. And, as far as I can tell, there appear to be different cultural 
views of what it means to tell the truth, how binding the law is and whether court orders need to be 
strictly followed or not.5 These are somewhat adventurous impressionistic observations about culture. 
Auckland and Wellington are not as different from one another as New Zealand is from the United 
States. But the appreciable differences that do exist make me wonder just what New Zealand culture 
is and will be, which city's culture is closer to that future culture, and which is the more "provincial". 
I think the New Zealand legal system, including the profession, the academy and the judiciary, needs 
to give some conscious thought to the implications of the increasing cultural diversity of New Zealand.  
III THE JUDICIARY AND ACADEMY 
I turn now to some comparisons between the judiciary and legal academy and the profession. It is 
difficult to assess whether Posner was less complimentary of the judiciary or the academy in his book. 
Before enumerating 26 deficiencies of the United States federal judiciary over two chapters, he said:6 
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I had taken too much for granted. I had missed a certain staleness in the current judicial culture – a 
tendency of judges to recite propositions of doubtful veracity just because they had been repeated before; 
a lack of curiosity and imagination; a lack of clarity and candor; and a weak sense of fact.  
On the other hand, Posner was also critical of academics. He said "rewards (status, prestige, not 
necessarily money) in academic law go to doctrinalists and theoreticians who write for each other on 
a plane of discourse inaccessible or unhelpful to judges".7  
America, as Donald Trump seems determined to demonstrate, is different. A number of the 
tendencies Posner laments in United States scholarship and judgery are absent in New Zealand: the 
dominant role of judicial clerks; the dominant role of student-edited law reviews; the theoretical bent 
of much United States legal scholarship; the lack of interaction between the judiciary and academy.  
And I think Posner's underlying assumption that a key role of the legal academy is to help the judiciary 
cope with their own systemic difficulties is misplaced though I see at least one former Australian 
judge, now at a law school, disagrees.8 
Personally, I would prefer the academy engage in research and scholarship into legal issues that 
matter to New Zealand's society, polity, economy, and culture and teach law students how to think 
about those legal issues in context. In New Zealand's legal system today, that requires more focus on 
Parliament and the executive than on the judiciary. If anything, I think the way law is taught in New 
Zealand is still too oriented to case law. Of course it is important for students to be taught how to read 
cases and to appreciate how judges make decisions. But my experience is that New Zealand law 
graduates understand that at the expense of understanding the relationship between law and policy 
and how legislation and executive decisions are made in reality. 
I do consider milder versions of some of the tendencies Posner identifies in the United States can 
be detected here. And I think his primary general point applies to New Zealand. I think there is a gulf 
of understanding and interests between the legal academy and the judiciary in New Zealand and it is 
growing. More mutual understanding between, and interest in, what each other is and does would be 
desirable in the separate interests of each. 
In what follows I offer "impressions", not of individual academics and judges (tempting though 
that is), but, first, of who they are and, second, what they do. 
IV WHO ARE ACADEMICS, LAWYERS AND JUDGES? 
I suggest there are more similarities between legal academics, judges and practitioners than 
differences. Most importantly, they all have law degrees. As any student or graduate of Victoria 
University of Wellington Law School will know, having a law degree means you can think like a 
  
7  At 295. 
8  KM Hayne "The Australian Judicial System: Causes for Dissatisfaction" (2018) 92 ALJ 32. 
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lawyer – which is not a cultural attribute to be underestimated. I have written in recent articles about 
the importance of disciplinary training and experience in shaping the different outlook, worldview, 
culture or language of each branch of government. I have characterised the judiciary as speaking the 
language of the common law method:9 
Paradigmatically, common lawyers and judges approach an opinion, an argument or a judgment by 
identifying the issue, identifying the material facts, outlining the relevant law, examining the arguments 
from both (ie, two) sides and applying the law to the facts. This is an inductive form of reasoning — from 
the particulars of individual cases towards the general rule. It pays attention to specific factual context of 
the particular cases. It looks to past precedents for guidance. 
But there are differences in how lawyers, judges and academics speak this language. The working 
lives of lawyers and judges are dominated by the common law method of examining one case after 
another. That is the emphasis of a bachelor's degree in law. Graduate degrees, particularly doctorates, 
tend to take you into other disciplinary realms and into broader perspectives on the normative values 
that should be in law – into policy. 
Every legal academic in New Zealand has a law degree and almost all now have post-graduate 
law degrees. We have departed from the old English tradition of not requiring law practitioners to 
have a law degree. We have not yet reached the American position where some academics – including 
my former doctoral supervisor at Yale – are appointed to law schools without a law degree. But the 
international market for academics in law, as in other disciplines, increasingly demands academics 
either have or get a doctorate, mostly, now, from overseas. At Victoria University of Wellington, 20 
of the 35 faculty members have doctorates and 15 have master's degrees. The doctorates are from the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and Germany in that order of frequency. 
Accordingly, it is not now uncommon for junior academics to be recruited at or towards the end 
of their studies – and thus with no or little experience of, or interest in, legal practice. This is a far cry 
from the days, a generation or two ago, when most faculty members practised law as well. More New 
Zealand academics do have more experience of the practice of law than in elite United States law 
schools. A few have had distinguished careers in practice before moving to academia, such as 
Professor Campbell McLachlan QC. Others, such as Professor John Prebble QC and Professor 
Richard Boast QC, have developed and maintained expert legal practices in their specialty areas while 
academics. But, overall, the New Zealand legal academy has less experience of legal practice than it 
used to and my impression is that is an increasing trend.  
With a degree of bootstrap circularity, the broader nature of academic legal inquiry now required 
in a graduate degree reinforces the broader nature of academic legal inquiry. While cases form a core 
focus of academic inquiry, academics can and should bring other disciplinary perspectives and 
  
9  Matthew Palmer "Constitutional Dialogue and the Rule of Law" (2017) 47 HKLJ 505 at 518. 
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techniques to bear on the legal issues underlying cases. They can and should take a more general 
perspective of the coherence and consistency of the law found in cases and legislation as well as of 
policy issues underlying that law.  
I suspect some of the disconnect between academia and the judiciary lies in that difference of 
perspective between law and policy about which I have written elsewhere.10 In general, the judiciary 
must focus on what the law is and academics focus on what the law should be. But, as we know, many 
judgments make law, particularly at the appellate level. I suggest it is no coincidence that the senior 
appellate courts, which take broader judicial views of the coherence and consistency of law and the 
policy underlying it, have the most interest in academic scholarship. And this is reflected in the ratios 
of post-graduate degrees at the different levels of senior court bench. More judges have post-graduate 
law degrees than do most practitioners, and the proportion increases through the hierarchy of the 
courts. Two of the five current Supreme Court judges have doctorates (from Cambridge and Oxford) 
and two have master's degrees (from Stanford and Queen's). Five of the 10 Court of Appeal judges 
have master's degrees and another was a Rhodes Scholar. Of the 46 High Court judges and Associate 
Judges, 17 have master's degrees and four have doctorates.  
One of the effects of the different ages and stages of the judicial and academic career paths in 
New Zealand is that each has a markedly different age profile. I have not got hard statistics on this 
but my personal experience is a case in point. At 53 I am one of the youngest half dozen or so of the 
46 High Court judges. At Victoria University of Wellington, if I were still there, I would be amongst 
the oldest 10 or so of the 35 academics currently there. Needless to say, different generations have 
different perspectives of issues, something judges might wish to remember. 
The difference in respective career paths also accounts for a difference in how well off judges and 
academics are financially. Both groups have given up the filthy lure of lucre in private practice, as 
they will tell you. But judges are paid much better than academics. And because most of them have 
already spent most of their careers in significantly better paid private practice they are much better 
off than academics. I have not thought carefully enough about this difference to draw further 
implications from it. Perhaps the academics here will. 
V PRESSURE OF WORK 
What of the work of academics, judges and lawyers? Surprisingly, at least to me, I have found 
being a judge more similar to being an academic than to being a law practitioner. There are two main 
parts of an academic's job: teaching and research. There are two equivalent parts to a judge's job: 
  
10  Matthew Palmer "Open the Doors and Where are the People? Constitutional Dialogue in the Shadow of the 
People" in Claire Charters and Dean R Knight (eds) We, The People(s): Participation in Governance (Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, 2011) at 50. 
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hearings and writing judgments. I will spend some time exploring each of these. But first a note about 
workload. 
Academics, judges and lawyers all work hard, as I am sure you will all agree, at least in relation 
to the group of which you are a member, if you are. But my experience is they all have different views 
on how hard each other works! This is dangerous territory and you will understand my views are 
simply impressions based on my personal experience at different stages of my own career. It may not 
be yours. And there are different dimensions to what "hard work" is: number of hours? or intensity 
and complexity? or pressure and stress?  
My experience is that High Court judges work very hard. I made a list of all the things I dealt with 
during just one week of being the "duty judge" in Auckland in 2016. The areas of law involved: 
 commercial proceedings between a finance company and its debenture trustee; 
 custody of children; 
 termination of a trust; 
 a bail appeal for a burglar; 
 setting aside a disposition of property; 
 a commercial dispute under arbitration; 
 drug dealing criminal charges; 
 defamation; 
 patent infringement; 
 severe commercial relationship difficulties between fruit and vegetable business owners; 
 a body corporate arrangement proposal; 
 restraining orders over the proceeds of crime; 
 confidentiality orders; 
 a dispute between neighbours over a driveway; 
 a dispute over a caveat preventing sale of a multimillion-dollar property; 
 access by the media to a court file regarding copyright infringement; 
 taking a guilty plea for grievous bodily harm; 
 granting bail, or not, for an alleged murderer; 
 granting a bail variation for an alleged kidnapper; 
 a bail appeal for assault; and 
 a bail appeal for drugs. 
Much of the work was procedural management: list court hearing; setting down substantive 
hearings; making orders about timetabling. But other work was substantive. A duty week in Auckland 
usually involves three civil list hearings, each of which involves 10 to 30 files being called in an hour 
or so for procedural directions to be made. It also usually involves:  
 an arraignment (where a guilty plea is taken) and/or a sentencing or two;  
 several bail or sentence or conviction appeals; and  
304 (2018) 49 VUWLR 
 one or two one-hour or two-hour civil hearings into something which may be either very 
straightforward or quite complex, which often require reserved judgments. 
I generally get one duty week each quarter or half year, and one dedicated week a quarter to write 
judgments. Additional judgment time is also usually allocated after civil hearings and it arises on an 
ad hoc basis when cases settle or trials resolve. Otherwise, each week is allocated to either civil or 
criminal hearings, whether short cause hearings of half a day to two days or longer trials of one to 10 
weeks. Those hearing weeks include eight to 10 weeks out of town, on circuit, each year. The "circuit" 
for Auckland judges involves travel to Whangārei, Tauranga, Hamilton and Rotorua.  
In two years and five months sitting as a judge I have delivered 188 judgments. That is around 
three and a half judgments a month, or almost one a week. I have not kept track of the much greater 
number of minutes and bench notes. These numbers vary over time of course. You cannot issue as 
many judgments during a long trial. In the course of an 11-week manslaughter and kidnapping jury 
trial last year, I found I had time to issue only one substantive judgment, two judgments on leave to 
appeal and two costs judgments that I had previously reserved. During that trial, and relating to the 
trial I issued five formal rulings, 41 bench notes and five judgments, and three judgments and six 
minutes immediately prior to it. 
There is more than enough work for judges to do in the High Court. But the nature of it is different 
from that in practice even though you are dealing with court cases in both roles. Again, I should 
emphasise that these are my views only. I know different judges have different experiences of 
workload. But, personally, I have felt the pressure of time to be appreciably less at the bench than at 
the bar. I feel I have the ability to take more time to get my judgments right – or as right as they are 
going to be. A colleague of mine likens the role to being on a conveyer belt where one case after 
another inexorably presents itself as an opportunity to trip or fall behind. And too sustained a period 
of short cause civil hearings can lead to that feeling. But, so far, with the advantage of a big common 
room in Auckland around which work is spread, I have found it manageable – more manageable than 
practice and more manageable than life as Dean here.  
Incidentally, there is a conventional view of academic life as contemplative, laid-back and relaxed. 
It is not. The pressures of teaching and research in a New Zealand university today are, in my view, 
just as great as they often are in practice of law or on the bench. No doubt much pressure in all roles 
is self-generated by the commitment and dedication of the individual, especially those with an A-type 
personality. And there are more opportunities, indeed expectations, of attendance at overseas 
conferences in academia. But those in practice should not assume the pressure of work on an academic 
who must teach young minds, mark hundreds of assignments or tests, research in depth and write 
scholarship that contributes original knowledge to the world necessarily reflects the far lower pay 
rates they receive.  
Finally, while I am on such comparisons, I should also say that neither the judiciary, private 
practice nor academic life contained the level of pressure on time I experienced in the public service, 
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either as a policy manager as Deputy Secretary for Justice or as a legal manager as Deputy Solicitor-
General. 
At the bar you feel responsible for the carriage of a client's case. Strangely enough, I have a 
different sense now of the extent to which counsel contribute to the outcome of a case than I did when 
I was at the bar. And, perhaps not as strangely, I feel a greater sense of responsibility for that outcome 
now, as a judge. I do think there is more pressure of responsibility on a judge than an academic or 
practitioner. While failing students matters, of course, there is nothing equivalent in academic life to 
the sense of responsibility you have as a judge in sentencing someone to prison. It weighs on you.  
I felt a similar pressure of responsibility as a public servant, whether at Crown Law, the Ministry 
of Justice or the Treasury. But that was responsibility at a different level – responsibility for advice, 
rather than decisions, usually, as at the bar – and also responsibility for broad effects of policies and 
the wider interests of the Crown and the public of New Zealand. I feel that as a judge too, especially 
in making decisions or obiter observations about the law that have precedential significance. But there 
were only a few occasions as a public servant when I felt the sort of concentrated responsibility for 
affecting the life of an individual to the extent I do when contemplating sentencing a person to 
imprisonment for a lengthy period. Although judges are seen as a sort of mouthpiece of society, that 
is a very personal interaction and it is combined, sometimes, with making precedential decisions with 
potentially systemic effects.  
VI THE CLASSROOM AND COURTROOM 
When I moved from policy advice and then academia to litigation I thought appearing in court 
was a bit like a combination of advising a minister and teaching. It had the public performance aspect 
of teaching targeted at an individual or small group of individual judges. Having now jumped the 
bench, I have a different view of who is analogous to the lecturer. I have experienced far less 
performance anxiety on the bench than at the bar during the hearing of a case, rather like the difference 
between being a lecturer and a student in a class of Socratic dialogue. And, I can confirm my friend 
David Goddard's suspicion that, while barristers have to enjoy talking, judges have to enjoy listening. 
Perhaps presiding in court is like a combination of teaching and chairing a meeting – particularly 
a faculty meeting. There is still the public performance aspect. In each setting you need a degree of 
persuasive authority to keep order, and you can find yourself dealing with difficult students, faculty 
members, counsel or litigants in person. You have to read the materials, think about the issues and be 
ready to engage with counsel, faculty or students, especially in Socratic teaching. The point of the 
engagement is different in each role. As a judge the oral hearing is an opportunity to inform yourself 
about the issues, evidence, law and arguments in order to give the parties a fair hearing and improve 
the ultimate quality of your judgment, though it may have the effect of helping counsel better 
understand the case, the nature of advocacy and the law in general. As a lecturer, the lecture is an 
opportunity to inform the students about the specific and general aspects of the law as well as to teach 
them to "think like a lawyer".  
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I have not yet seen an equivalent to the practice of some lecturers at Victoria walking out of class 
if enough students randomly called on have not prepared. With some counsel it is tempting, but it 
would not be fair to their clients. With litigants in person I suspect it might engender a similar reaction 
to that experienced by one lecturer at Victoria when I was Dean. Within an hour of the lecturer walking 
out, I received a phone call from The Dominion Post after students complained.  
Like some students, a few counsel and most litigants in person are ill-equipped to make legal 
arguments – usually in inverse proportion to their own confidence. As I said in a recent judgment, in 
relation to litigants in person there is a fine line to be walked.11 And 16 per cent of my cases, usually 
civil, have involved litigants in person.  
I note, for the benefit of Victoria law students here, that Socratic dialogue does teach you how to 
perform as counsel appearing in court. It has all the same aspects – lack of time to prepare, the terror 
of not knowing what questions will be asked, the power imbalance, and the huge buzz after an 
effective interaction. I consider the most effective gentle Socratic dialogue I have conducted to have 
been not in a classroom but in a criminal sentence appeal in a courtroom in Hamilton, which resulted 
in Crown consent to turn it into a conviction appeal as well, which was ultimately successful.  
VII JUDGMENTS, SCHOLARSHIP AND OPINIONS 
In my view, the role of judge is not only similar to that of lecturer in terms of court or classroom 
appearances but also in the other primary aspect of each role. After a hearing or lecture, you wander 
back to your chambers or office to write. The nature of what you write is different. But in essence, 
each job involves appearing in public and writing in private. As does that of the barrister.  
One of the most significant differences between the writing of legal academics and judges, and 
between lawyers and judges, is that a judge is required to make decisions. You cannot end your 
judgment with a plea for other scholars to research and clarify the area of law. You cannot end by 
reference to one hand and the other. You cannot give a percentage chance of success. You must decide 
and the reasons for your decision will be public. At the Auckland launch of the Feminist Judgments 
of Aotearoa book,12 Professor Janet Maclean noted that as a point of distinction compared with 
academic work. I concur. Though there is not nearly as much difference in that between judges and 
the law officers of the Crown, who often also make authoritative decisions.13  
Incidentally, I note for judges that what they say in judgments matters in the academy. It provides 
more fodder for academic discourse. But academics can also take encouragement and stimulation 
  
11  Low Volume Vehicle Technical Assoc Inc v Brett [2017] NZHC 3281.  
12  Elisabeth McDonald and others (eds) Feminist Judgments of Aotearoa New Zealand – Te Rino: A Two 
Stranded-Rope (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2017). 
13  Matthew Palmer "What is New Zealand's constitution and who interprets it? Constitutional realism and the 
importance of public office-holders" (2006) 17 PLR 133.  
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from judgments engaging with their critiques. This demonstrates their work is of value in the real 
world, if it is. And it may be recognised as a formal indicator of "peer esteem" in the Performance-
Based Research Fund (PBRF) academic assessment and funding system. Personally, I think it is useful 
for judgments to stimulate agreement and disagreement with good quality and relevant academic 
commentary, where the judge is aware of it and has time to do so. I try to make a practice of that. In 
fact, I am happiest when I write a judgment that does three things simultaneously:  
 resolves the dispute between the parties;  
 develops the law; and 
 contributes to academic debates about what the law is and how it should be developed. 
There are more opportunities to do this than I had expected.  
Judgments are usually shorter than academic articles, and are certainly shorter than books, though 
many are longer than they need to be. I was struck by the observation of one judge who found writing 
judgments diametrically different to writing opinions for clients in practice. Instead of writing with a 
slant or angle orientated to the client, a judgment is written on a neutral basis, in the public interest, 
based on what the judge thinks the law is and how it applies to the facts. What struck me was not that 
distinction, but the fact I see almost no difference between the voice in which I write judgments and 
articles. A judge and an academic both write in their own voices, about what they understand the law 
to be and what they think it should be. And I have found the academic experience of writing a doctoral 
dissertation and books – with all the work involved in striving for structure, coherence and clarity – 
to be immensely useful in writing longer judgments. When I say longer, my longest judgment so far 
is 194 paragraphs – involving the intersection of tort and contract liability in relation to interest rate 
swaps to dairy farmers.14 
I have found matters of fact are much harder to decide than matters of law. The facts of a case are 
served up to you by witnesses and documents. Lawyers draw your attention to the facts they submit 
are salient. Sometimes their account is not enough for you to be sure of what happened. But you still 
have to make a decision about them. When in doubt I have found, so far, the best approach is to be 
very transparent about the limitations of the material before you, what you think about them and why. 
The law is much easier. You can retire to your chambers to think about it, unless it is a jury trial, 
and get your clerk to do more research – though significant additional information should be put to 
counsel for comment. I have been blessed with exceptionally talented and helpful law clerks: Stephen 
Laing, for a few months, Yasmin Olsen for two years and now Jessica Storey. Most High Court judges 
share one clerk between two and have a full associate. I have reversed that ratio as have a few other 
judges now. I greatly value being able to have a whole clerk and, instead, to share an associate, Bella 
Panoho, for whose help I am also extremely grateful. I treat a clerk pretty much as I did a research 
  
14  Cygnet Farms Ltd v ANZ Bank New Zealand (No 2) [2016] NZHC 2838, [2017] 2 NZLR 538. 
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assistant in law school – seeking research memoranda about aspects of law, issue spotting in upcoming 
cases, fact checking as well as proofing and also as a sounding board. This is another debt my judging 
has to academia. 
Posner complained bitterly in his book about the United States practice of law clerks doing the 
first drafts of judgments. I agree. I consider committing my reasoning to writing constitutes my 
"judgement" and determines the result of a case. To me, reasons and reasoning are the most distinctive 
aspect of the judicial enterprise compared with that of the other two branches of government. The 
judiciary is required to reason and to make public that reasoning in applying the law to the facts of 
individual cases to "do right by law". So I am appointed to reason; my law clerks are not. It seems 
that is no longer thought to be the case in the United States appellate courts. I do not understand that 
to be the position in New Zealand and it should not be. 
Oral judgments are still delivered in New Zealand. Many judges, including me, deliver oral 
judgments for bail and sentence appeals and sometimes other matters as well. That accounts for 29 
per cent of my judgments so far. But the majority of judgments are reserved and written. I think the 
mode of delivery matters. There is something about pinning inchoate thoughts down in writing that 
requires them to be more precisely formulated. I do not like the expression "reduced to writing" for 
this reason – I prefer "committed to writing". Committing your views to writing commits you to a 
certain path of logic and reasoning. If you get stuck you can retrace your steps to see where you went 
wrong. You cannot do that if your steps are already uttered orally.  
Furthermore my observation is that the mode by which thoughts are committed to writing matters. 
Dictating preserves much of the tone and style of orality. I also think it makes for more discursive 
language and more words. I was taught to touch type at secondary school in the United States, so 
since the advent of the personal computer in the 1980s I have always written by typing on screen.  I 
think on screen. I hope that makes my writing tighter and clearer than it would be otherwise. But in 
any case, by now, I cannot do it any other way. 
My most important observation about the process of writing judgments is that it matters. My 
experience is that the need to explain your reasoning is a very real constraint on the discretion of 
judges. I had always been sceptical about whether judges decide the result and write the reasoning to 
fit. Early on as a judge, I got into the habit of writing a summary paragraph, or sometimes two, 
immediately after the hearing. Usually there is a gap of several weeks between a hearing and when 
you can start writing a judgment – because there is almost always a backlog to deal with. But within 
a month of starting as a judge, I found my reasoning could change the result I thought I favoured. A 
fact or an aspect of law not appreciated at the hearing can make its presence felt when I explain my 
reasoning in writing. And, it can change the result I thought I was going to reach.  
I have also adopted the practice of including my summary at the beginning of a written judgment. 
This is probably influenced by the practice I have always liked of some academic journals of requiring 
abstracts at the beginning of academic articles they publish, as well as the need to summarise advice 
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for ministers. I am in a minority in doing this in judgments in New Zealand – there are only two other 
High Court judges who routinely put the result upfront. I think the view against it is that it can make 
the result of the judgment look predetermined. But a judgment is not a mystery novel. Readers of a 
written judgment know the result has already been determined and usually flick to the end to find out 
the answer. They want to know what the result is and the reasons for it and encapsulating both of 
those things upfront in a summary is just that – upfront. If I do not summarise it someone else will. I 
would rather do it myself, as part of the judgment. I think it improves the accessibility of the judgment, 
and therefore the law, to the reader and thereby enhances the rule of law. A realist committed to 
candour could hardly do anything else. 
VIII GENERALISM AND SPECIALISM 
I think the second most significant difference between legal academics and judges is that 
academics are specialists and judges are generalists. Posner makes this point about the United States 
and it is true in New Zealand too. Academics are now advised to specialise at a relatively early stage 
of their careers – ideally in areas in which they both teach and research. By the time they become 
senior academics they have sometimes broadened out again, usually by broadening their areas of 
speciality. Professor John Burrows QC, a national taonga, is a stand-out example. He has been the 
primary author of the standard text on statutory interpretation and co-author of texts on contract law, 
tort law and media law.15  
Judges in the senior courts must deal with all legal disputes which come their way in whatever 
area of law. My greatest satisfaction in academic work lay in the opportunity to become more expert 
in the depths of a particular area of law. My greatest satisfaction in judicial work so far is to gain some 
understanding of the patterns across broad swathes of law. Doing so promotes consistency and 
coherence in the application of legal principle across all areas of law. The profession has a choice. 
But I do consider overspecialisation in some areas of the profession – the tax bar and resource 
management bar spring to mind – has had negative effects on the understanding of law in those fields.  
Generalism must, however, mean that, especially when they are relatively new, judges are dealing 
with areas of law of which they do not fully appreciate all the ins and outs. In the 16 judgments I 
delivered in my first three months of being a judge I had previously come across the relevant law in 
only one. That one, in which I considered I had some expertise, was the only one that was appealed 
and, of course, overturned both by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.16 Though the score 
  
15  For the latest editions of these texts see Ross Carter Burrows and Carter Statute Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 
LexisNexis, Wellington, 2015); Stephen Todd and others (eds) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (7th ed, 
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2016); Jeremy Finn, Stephen Todd and Matthew Barber Burrows, Finn and 
Todd on the Law of Contract in New Zealand (6th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2018); and Ursula Cheer 
Burrows and Cheer Media Law in New Zealand (7th ed, 2015, LexisNexis, Wellington). 
16  Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand Inc v Minister of Conservation  [2016] NZHC 220, 
(2016) 19 ELRNZ 370; Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand Inc v Minister of 
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was five to four across all three benches! The process of refinement on appeal clearly benefited the 
nature of the arguments and quality of the ultimate decision.  
IX APPEALS 
The decisions of all judges are subject to appeal, unless you are a Supreme Court judge who is 
always right (because you are final). My reaction to being appealed is not what I had thought it might 
be. Before I was appointed, I regarded with some scepticism the claim by judges that they did not 
much mind being overturned on appeal. One reason why I mind less than I expected is that by the 
time the appellate judgment is out, you struggle to remember the detail of what you had held or to 
muster the energy to go back over it. A judge is always aware that any decision could be appealed. 
You expect some judgments to be appealed – especially in criminal law or in novel areas of law. And 
if you make a mistake then you want that mistake to be corrected on appeal, particularly when you 
are dealing with far-reaching decisions on people's personal liberty. 
I was interested in my own reactions to the two appeals which have overturned my decisions so 
far. I have not minded the end result changing in either – I regarded the final appellate decision in 
each as entirely reasonable. In fact, in one I liked the outcome of the appellate judgment much better 
than I liked that of my own. However, I have felt minor irritation at a statement in one of the appeal 
judgments that I felt mis-characterised a minor part of the reasoning in my judgment.  
I still think there is usually some effect on the ego of being overturned. The extent may differ 
from judge to judge. But I think its existence is a reason why there are issues of principle with the 
commonplace practice in New Zealand of judges deciding whether to grant leave to appeal from their 
own decisions in certain sorts of cases. There is a safety valve in the Court of Appeal being able to 
have a second look at such applications. There are good practical reasons of efficiency supporting the 
practice. And my view is in the minority. But, in terms of the long-term legitimacy of the judiciary, I 
do not much like the risk that a judge deciding whether there should be an appeal from his or her own 
judgment would be perceived to be a judge in his or her own cause. A judge's judgment is not his or 
her own "cause", of course. But I doubt that distinction would be widely appreciated by litigants or 
lay observers. 
Academics do not suffer from appeals – though the PBRF might be regarded as one. For those of 
you who do not know, the PBRF is an exercise conducted by panels of academics to assess the quality 
of other academics' research for institutional funding purposes. As you might expect, it was deeply 
unpopular with most academics when it was introduced. As a dean, and as a member of the first two 
PBRF panels in law, I consider it had beneficial effects in enhancing the research culture in New 
Zealand law schools.  
  
Conservation [2016] NZCA 411, [2016] 3 NZLR 828; and Hawke's Bay Regional Investment Co Ltd v Royal 
Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand Inc [2017] NZSC 106, [2017] 1 NZLR 1041.  
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But the system has had unfortunate effects in skewing the perceived value placed on certain types 
of academic publications: 
 There has been a perception that publishing in elite overseas academic publications matters 
more than in New Zealand publications under the PBRF.  
 There has been a perception that texts do not carry as much weight as articles.  
 And there has been a perception that, to be a serious legal academic, you must grapple with 
jurisprudential theory in your publications.  
There is something in these perceptions. Publication in the Modern Law Review will be a marker 
of quality. Revisions to a previous edition of a law text do not always demonstrate significant amounts 
of original academic scholarship; they may be simple updating. And attending to the theoretical 
groundings of any field of law will deepen understanding of it. But my experience of the PBRF was 
the Law Panel members read all of the nominated publications and made their own assessment of 
their quality – where they were published and whether they were texts or articles mattered less than 
what they said. Pure legal theory was assessed alongside all other areas of law. Those who compose 
the law members of the PBRF Panel can do most to assist by ensuring the value attached to legal 
scholarship does not suffer from such distortions as those perceived, and by communicating accurate 
signals of what is valued in New Zealand. Because perception can become its own reality.  
As a generalist judge I particularly value specialist legal texts that bring order and coherence to 
fields of case law that are otherwise difficult to access. I value articles on aspects of New Zealand law 
which are often of less interest to foreign journals than comparative work. And, while I value the role 
of theory in revealing underlying fault lines in the coherence of law, I do share Posner's concern that 
the United States legal academy is at risk of disappearing into its own theoretical artifice if it does not 
stay grounded in its application to legal issues that matter. I do not consider the New Zealand academy 
has come close to reaching the ethereal heights of some North American scholarship. But academic 
markets are international and are still often driven by trends in North America. I suggest care has to 
be taken by legal theorists to ensure theory is (eventually) applied to legal issues that matter.  
X INDEPENDENCE 
I make one final observation about a common cultural attitude of the legal academy, judiciary and 
profession. They are all jealous of their independence, which has legal protection in each case: 
 Section 23 of the Constitution Act 1986 protects judges against removal and s 3 of the Senior 
Courts Act 2016 recognises the established constitutional doctrine of judicial independence. 
Each New Zealand judge is not only independent of the other branches of government but of 
each other, except as provided otherwise by law.  
 Academics are not legally immune from removal. But s 161 of the Education Act 1989 
declares the intention of Parliament in enacting the provisions of the Act relating to 
institutions that "academic freedom and the autonomy of institutions are to be preserved and 
enhanced". It defines academic freedom to include "the freedom of academic staff and 
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students, within the law, to question and test received wisdom, to put forward new ideas and 
to state controversial or unpopular opinions". Section 162 further recognises universities' role 
as "critic and conscience of society".  
 Law practitioners, too, enjoy statutory recognition of the independence of their role. Section 
4 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 declares the fundamental obligations of 
lawyers to include the obligations: to uphold the rule of law; to facilitate the administration 
of justice in New Zealand; and to be independent in providing regulated services in 
accordance with all fiduciary duties to his or her clients, whose interests he or she has an 
obligation to protect, subject to overriding duties as an officer of the High Court. Law 
practitioners in government have an additional level of independence as public servants. 
My experience is that all three groups of lawyers, in the judiciary, the academy, and the profession, 
feel their independence keenly. They will assert it when they consider they need to. That is how it 
should be but it does have a consequence with which some people here will be familiar. 
None of these groups of lawyers or former lawyers much like management or being managed. 
That may be a cultural attitude of lawyers generally. I share it. The oft-used metaphor of herding cats 
springs to mind. I have managed three groups of around 40 lawyers — as policy advisers in the 
Ministry of Justice, as legal academics at Victoria University, and as legal advisers in Crown Law. I 
am now a member of a group of 46 former lawyers on the High Court. The similarities between all 
those groups' collective attitudes to management vastly outweigh their differences. It is difficult to 
tell whether academics or judges are the most resistant. In this regard I draw to Dean Hickford's 
attention Minerva Cheevy's 2011 blog on Advanced Faculty Wrangling, for an extended analogy of 
cat herding, if he has not seen it already.17 Actually, at a big picture level, I think resistance is often 
justified and not always futile, though it can manifest in unfortunate ways. The consequence can be 
significant tensions between faculty members and university management and between judges and 
the Ministry of Justice. But both of those topics are for a different lecture. 
I should say, though, what a supportive environment I have found the Auckland High Court 
common room to be. It collectively welcomes new arrivals and supports you on an ongoing basis as 
does what is known as the wider judicial "family". 
XI PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT 
Finally, I want to note one dimension of the academic role which I suggest academics could do 
better and judges could learn from. Section 162 of the Education Act, which follows the section which 
preserves academic freedom, itemises five characteristics possessed by all universities. One of them 
is they "accept a role as critic and conscience of society". This is sometimes cited by academics as 
  
17  Minerva Cheevy "Advanced faculty wrangling techniques" (23 September 2011) The Chronicle 
<www.chronicle.com>. 
 IMPRESSIONS OF LIFE AND LAW ON THE HIGH COURT BENCH 313 
part and parcel of their academic freedom. But I think that it contains positive obligations on them as 
well. 
When I was Dean of Law at Victoria I would often be contacted to comment by the national media 
on issues of public law. I would try to do so, as long as I felt well enough informed about the matter, 
because I considered and still consider that is part of the role of universities. Sometimes, if I was too 
busy or conflicted, I would not comment and on some of those occasions, the story would not run or 
would quickly die. I think the legal academy in New Zealand do not make their expert views available 
enough to New Zealand society, whether as critic and conscience or as commentators. There are a 
number who do and do so well – I think of Dr Dean Knight and Professor Andrew Geddis in particular.  
Many legal academics, somewhat surprisingly, shun public exposure and prefer to keep modestly 
to themselves, teaching and researching and staking out positions only in academic publications. But 
academic publications are not enough. Participation in mainstream and social media is vital to ensure 
New Zealand has a robust and informed civil society. That is more important than ever in an 
international age of post-truth politics, fake news, alternative facts and what seems to be an 
international trend towards illiberalism even in democracies. New Zealand society needs critics and 
consciences to speak up. Legal academics have particular authority and expertise to share. Perhaps 
they could start with taking up some of the topics I have covered impressionistically today, which are 
not written on extensively, and which lack a rigorous theoretical framework which I have not 
remedied.  
And perhaps judges need to think about whether that is a similarity or a difference with their role. 
Judges do and must speak authoritatively of the law through their judgments. Only occasionally do 
New Zealand judges speak extrajudicially. At the time of giving this lecture, no speeches or public 
lectures by judges are posted on the Courts of New Zealand website for 2018.18 Only eight speeches 
or public lectures are posted from 2017 and 10 in 2016. There were 20 in 2015. Of those 38 speeches 
in four years, three judges gave all but six of them: Elias CJ, Glazebrook J and Kós J and P (and I 
gave two of those six).  
There is room for more contribution to public discourse by judges. I am not saying judges should 
publicly advocate policy or political positions. They should not. But greater public understanding and 
discussion of the judicial role ought to enhance support for the rule of law which is and ought to be a 
constitutional norm in New Zealand. I believe extrajudicial stimulation can contribute to that. As I 
have tried to do today.  
Nā reira, tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou, tēnā tatou katoa. 
  
  
18  Courts of New Zealand "Speeches and papers" <www.courtsofnz.govt.nz>. 
314 (2018) 49 VUWLR 
 
